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~

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a negligence action brought by plaintiffdriver against the driver of the other automobile to recover
damages for an unusual medical condition allegedly caused by
the collision.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was submitted to the jury on the issue of
whether the accident caused the medical condition of which
plaintiff complained.
cause of action".

The jury returned a verdict of "no

Plaintiff moved for a new trial pursuant to

Rule 59 (a) (3) on the ground that he was surprised by the
testimony of Defendant's expert medical witness.

The Third

Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, Judge G.
Hal Taylor presiding, denied plaintiff's motion.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks affirmation of the trial judge's
~der

denying plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 16, 1974, a Cadallic driven by the plaintiff,
Reid E. Jensen, was struck from the rear by a vehicle driven
by defendant Connie Gail Thomas.

Although the facts show that

there was no visible damage to plaintiff's automobile and
only very minor damage to defendant's Volkswagen, plaintiff
claimed that he suffered severe injuries arising out of this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l
accident.

Whether or not plaintiff's medical condit 1· 0

n was

caused by this accident became the chief issue at trial.
Plaintiff had a history of medical problems.
wounded and knocked unconscious during World War II.

He was
[R. 301]

His service related injuries caused him to receive a thirty
per cent (30%) disability rating from the government. [R.

JlJ]

In August, 1966, he suffered a severe heart attack. [R. 313]
Since 1966, plaintiff has been undergoing treatment for the
condition of hardening of the arteries (arteriosclerosis).
[R.

336]

In 1970 he was involved in the first of three rear·

end automobile collisions when his vehicle was struck by
another car.

[R. 313]

From this first accident, plaintiff

suffered a cervical sprain,

[R. 313] followed by numbness in

his extremities and headaches.

[R. 314]

In 1970, plaintiff

also became aware that he was suffering from Raynaud' s Pheno·
mena.

[R. 315] This condition affects the circulation to his

extremities.

[R. 386] On June 19, 1971, plaintiff had his

second severe heart attack [R. 317, 339], resulting from a
condition of blockage of the coronary arteries.

[R. 339]

This heart attack combined with the Raynaud' s Phenomena caused
him to retire.

[R. 317] In 1972 plaintiff had an open-heart

coronary by-pass surgery.

[R. 318, 389]

Plaintiff underwent

more surgery in 1973 when a lower rib and two sections of nerve I
ganglia were removed in order to alleviate problems in
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his lower extremities stemming from his Raynaud's Phenomena.
[R. 318]

Then in June 1974, plaintiff and defendant were

involved in the accident which is the subject of this law
suit.

Subsequently on July 29, 1976, plaintiff was involved
[R.

in yet another rear-end collision.

318]

Prior to trial plaintiff claimed that the accident
with defendant had aggrevated his Raynaud's Phenomena and also
caused him to suffer from a condition known as Transient
Ischemia Attack (hereinafter "TIA").

TIA is a "mini-stroke"

which is caused by the blood flow to the brain being temporarily interrupted.

[R. 365] This results in a brief loss of

brain function including vision.

[R.

365-366]

Through discovery, plaintiff found that defendant
intended to call Dr. Edward J. Hershgold as an expert medical
witness.

[R. 85] Dr. Hershgold had examined the plaintiff at

defendant's request.

Dr. Hershgold stated in his letter dated

May 14, 1976, that he could not "trace a direct connection
between his [plaintiff's] history of so-called whiplash injury
and the Raynaud' s. "

[R. -- two unnumbered pages between R. 226

and R. 227] .
On June 1, 1976, plaintiff deposed Dr. Hershgold.
After the deposition, plaintiff's attorney informed defendant's
attorney that he did not intend to claim that the accident of
June, 1974, had aggrevated the plaintiff's Raynaud's Phenomena.
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Prior to the trial, defendant's attorney advised
plaintiff's attorney that he still intended to call Dr. Hershgold as a witness.
At trial plaintiff called Dr. Van Dyke (through
videotape deposition) as one of his expert medical witnesses.
On cross-examination Dr. Van Dyke testified that it would be
very difficult for him to know whether the neck injury from
the 1970 accident or the 1974 accident was primarily responsible for plaintiff's TIA [R. 383]; and that plaintiff's heart
problems had a bearing on his TIA condition since "a defective
heart would not put out proper amounts of blood" and "a defective heart can also be the source of little clots which break
off and shoot out, you know, into arteries.

II

[R. 387]

Dr.

Van Dyke also testified that the single most important cause
of TIA is hardening of the arteries,

[R.

408, 412) and that in

every one of the 25 to 30 TIA patients he has treated within
the last two years, the TIA was related to disease of the
vascular system and not to injury to the neck.

[R. 414-415]

The following answer from plaintiff's own medical expert is
most revealing:
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY: Would it be a fair sta::. all probability
. .
of n1s
ment to say that in
t h e ca use arteries:
particular problem would be hardening of the
DR. VAN DYKE:

Yes.

[R.

415]

During the presentation of her case, defendant
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1

called Dr. Hershgold as an expert medical witness.

[R. 232]

Defendant's attorney questioned Dr. Hershgold in two areas:
(1)

Dr. Hershgold was questioned concerning

his findings from his examination relating to plaintiff's arteriosclerotic condition; and

(2)

Dr. Hershgold was questioned concerning

the fact that at no time during the medical exam of
plaintiff in May 1976 did plaintiff complain of any
visual disturbances which are the main symptoms of
TIA.
During his direct examination, defendant's attorney
did not ask Dr. Hershgold to state an opinion regarding whether
or not the accident of 1974 caused plaintiff's TIA.

His

testimony on direct examination went to his findings and
observations during his examination of the plaintiff.

His

diagnosis of arteriosclerosis corroborated testimony that had
already been received into evidence from Dr. Van Dyke, plaintiffs own medical witness.

However, on cross-examination,

Plaintiff's attorney opened this area up by asking if Dr.
Hershgold had an opinion on causation:
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY: As a matter of fact you
have no opinion on whether or not his -- one way or
other whether his transient ischemic attacks were
caused by the arteriosclerosis or something else?
DR. HERSHGOLD:

I have an opinion on that.

-5-
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PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY:
DR. HERSHGOLD:

You have an opinion?

Oh, yes.

[R.

246]

Plaintiff's attorney did not ask Dr. Hershgold to
state his opinion, so on redirect examination defendant's
attorney asked the Doctor what his opinion was.

[R. 25l]

?\<:1.iMi.ff·~

objection was overruled by the court.

[R. 251]

Dr. Hershgold stated that in his opinion, plaintiff's TIA is
due to his blood-vessel disease.

[R.

251-252]

At the close of all the evidence the court directed
a verdict against the defendant on negligence.

[R. 176]

The

case was submitted to the jury on the issue of whether or not
the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of
plaintiff's medical problems.

[R. 176]

The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant-·
no cause of action [R. 188)

Plaintiff thereupon moved for a

new trial pursuant to rule 59 (a) (3) Utah Rules of Civil Proce·
dure on the ground that he was surprised by Dr. Hershgold's
[R. 227]

Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial was

denied by the court.

[R. 263) Plaintiff filed a Notice of

testimony.

Appeal.
I.

[R.

264)

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF CANNOT CLAIM THAT HE WAS
SURPRISED BY AN EXPERT WITNESS'S

RESPONSE TO~

OPINION QUESTION WHICH HE ASKED.
wo theorie'
Plaintiff initially intended to presen t t
of injury at trial.

The first theory was that the accidenr
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caused plaintiffs TIA.

The second theory was that the collision

caused plaintiff's problems with Raynaud's Phenomena.

Defen-

dant retained Dr. Hershgold, a hematologist and circulartory
specialist, to conduct an independent medical examination of
the plaintiff.

Subsequent to the exam, plaintiff took Dr.

Hershgold' s deposition.

After the deposition plaintiff's

attorney informed defendant's attorney that plaintiff would
not claim any causal relationship between the automobile
~llision

and the Raynaud's Phenomena, and that plaintiff

would proceed on the sole theory that the accident caused
plaintiff's TIA.

[R. 257]

Such a change in strategy by the

plaintiff did not affect the defendant's list of witnesses,
and prior to trial plaintiff's attorney specifically told defendant's attorney that Dr. Hershgold would still be called as one
of defendant's expert witnesses.
At trial plaintiff called Dr. Van Dyke as an expert
medical witness.

On cross-examination, Dr. Van Dyke testified

concerning the causal relationship between the arteriosclerosis
and TIA.

[supra pg. 4]

Since this testimony had been taken by

videotape deposition before trial, plaintiff's attorney obviously knew what the testimony of his own witness would be.

He

also knew or should have known that plaintiff's arteriosclerosis
would be an issue at trial.
In her case in chief defendant called Dr. Hershgold
Prima ri· 1 Y for the purpose of corroborating Dr. Van Dyke's
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testimony regarding arteriosclerosis.

Dr · Hersh go ld simply

testified to his findings regarding plaintiff's arteriosclero: ..
condition made during the independent medical examination.
This testimony came in without objection by plaintiff• s attor~'
(R. 234-238]

Then defendant's attorney started to question Dr.

Hershgold regarding complaints plaintiff voiced during the
examination.

[R. 238]

At that point plaintiff objected and

the following colloquy was held outside the presence of the
jury.
MR. DeBRY:
You indicated that Dr. Hershgold
would be a witness, and therefore at our expen~,
our time, we took Dr. Hershgold' s deposition and we
asked by Interrogatory who you intended to call.
And you indicated by Answer to Interrogatory that
you intended to call Dr. Hershgold on the issue of
Raynaud' s.
And therefore we went to the time -- we
went to the expense to interrogate him on that
issue.
Now, that issue has never been brought up in
this case.
And we are completely got by surprise
and completely prejudiced.
And there is no way thac
I can properly protect my client, represent my
client when we haven't had a chance to interview or '
take a deposition of this witness beyond the scope
of the Raynaud's problem.
And if the interrogation goes beyond the scope
of the Raynaud' s problem, it is no issue in this
case.
THE COURT: Well, at this point the only. qu~sti:
was part of laying a foundation as to his med1ca
That can't surprise you.
history.
MR. DeBRY: Well, I presume that he is leading
up to -- I don't know what he is leading up to._t~
That's the point.
I have never taken his deposi ~·
THE COURT:

Why object at this stage?

MR. NEBEKER:
Let me just state, Your Hon~«
what Dr. Hershgold will testify to is basicall 1
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he has said. And that is whenever you have had a
hardening of the arteries condition that you have
these little platelets in the blood which break off
and that is what causes normally this particular
problem that we have here.
Now, that's the extent
of his testimony basically.
MR. DeBRY: Let me indicate that's completely
immaterial unless you want this witness to give his
expert opinion that in this case he has examined him
and in his expert opinion that caused it to a reasonable medical probability.
If you want him to give a
text book answer in some ethereal abstract sense,
sometimes arteriosclerosis causes it and sometimes
that causes Raynaud's, that permits the Jury to
speculate.
MR. NEBEKER:
I think where Dr. Van Dyke has
testified to these same facts, he has already testified
to this condition that this man has arteriosclerosis,
that it can cause this particular problem.
In fact
he said it would have to be taken into account. Dr.
Hershgold is merely buttressing that opinion given
by Dr. Van Dyke this is what happens.
Mr. DeBRY: So I am not prejudiced and I didn't
have a chance to interrogate him. Where is your
testimony going to go?
MR. NEBEKER:
It's going to go to support the
statement from Van Dyke.
MR. DeBRY:
MR. NEBEKER:
MR. DeBRY:

That what?
That arteriosclerosis
Sometimes causes --

MR. NEBEKER:
-- that some -- Dr. Van Dyke said
it has to be taken into account as a factor. And I
think Dr. Hershgold can testify it's the same thing.
He is just testifying to the same facts basically
that Dr. Van Dyke is.
MR. DeBRY: Well then, I will object on the
basis that there is no foundation and that this is
permitting the witness and the Jury to speculate
unless he wants to give his opinion as to whether or

-9-
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not the a~cident caused this man's TIA or wheth ,
the arteriosclerosis caused it, but this abst ~
·
· d angerous for the Jury.
rac,
question
is
THE COURT:

Proximate cause is for the Jury.

MR. NEBEKER:
That's right, Your Honor. We
have a Supreme Court case where the Supreme court
said that even in the case where there was testimo·
in something like thirty percent of the cases in ·
some kind of an injury, that this was for the Jm
to determine whether or not that testimony -·
THE COURT:
Once you have laid the foundation ..
what is your ultimate question that you are going'.
ask the Doctor?
MR. NEBEKER:

I am merely going to ask him

if

THE COURT:

Are you going to pose a hypothetic;.

MR. NEBEKER:
No.
I am merely asking him to
testify to the fact that when he saw Mr. Jensen he
had this condition of arteriosclerosis, that that
condition is something that gives rise to this
problem of having these platelets break off. They
can travel to the brain and cause these mini stroke:
THE COURT:

He has already testified to that.

MR. NEBEKER:
He has already testified to that
I just wanted to ask him whether or not when Mr.
Jensen came in in May of 1976, whether or not he ..
complained of any visual disturbances. And he saic
he didn't.
I move all the testimony be stric\e
MR. DeBRY:
That's an abstract question.
on that basis.
MR. NEBEKER:
MR. DeBRY:

It is not abstract.
You have got to ask about this ma~..

MR. NEBEKER:
I am asking whether or n?t hewr
actually complained of any kind of visual distru ·
tand yo'Jr
THE COURT:
Apparently I doi:' t under~ h vou
objection.
He is asking a question to whic h 3 ~
obj ected in the abstract, came up to the Bene '
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I have taken a proffer of proof in effect. If he
said anything to him in taking his medical history
about complaining of this eye problem?
MR. NEBEKER:

That's right.

THE COURT: You still haven't answered my
question. What is the ultimate opinion.
MR. DeBRY: That's the danger. There is no
ultimate question, I think, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well now, if you'd let me interrogate him, please.
MR. NEBEKER: That would be the ultimate.
That's the final question I am going to ask him.
THE COURT:
MR. NEBEKER:

All right, what -Because he will testify that --

THE COURT: You are only going to ask one more
question, the one the objection is made to?
MR. NEBEKER:

That's about it.

THE COURT: Well, you certainly can't have any
objection to that.
MR. DEBRY: Well, I move that it all be stricken
insofar as he has stated no expert opinion. He has
not said that arteriosclerosis probably caused this
man's condition or even may have caused it. All he
has testified to in the abstract is that sometimes
in some people arteriosclerosis causes TIA and this
man may have arteriosclerosis.
And if anything permits the Jury to speculate,
that's it. We can get a textbook up here to say
arteriosclerosis sometimes causes TIA's.
THE COURT: The Jury is at liberty to reject
the testimony if thev want to. Is that the only
question you. have left?
MR. NEBEKER:

I think that's about it.

THE COURT: All right. We could have got over
that easier. And the Jury will be back at ten
after. Court will be in recess until that time. If
you have any other problems come into Chambers. [R. 239243]
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Thereupon the jury returned and defendant's attorney proceed,_
to ask exactly what he said he would.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You
may answer the last question.
Do you want her to
read it or do you want to reframe it?
MR. NEBEKER:

I will reframe it, Your Honor.

Q.

(By Mr. Nebeker)
Dr. Hershgold, do you recall
examining Mr. Jensen on May 3, 1976, at my
request?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And at that time did you take a history from
Mr. Jensen and talk to him about his physical
complaints?

A.

I did.

Q.

And at that time do you recall him making any
mention of any kind of visual disturbances
when you talked to him?

A.

No, I don't.
MR. NEBEKER:

That's all, Your Honor. [R. 243·

244]
Obviously there was nothing inadmissible in Dr.
Hershgold' s direct testimony.

He merely testified to his

medical findings regarding plaintiff's arteriosclerosis and tc
the fact that plaintiff had not complained of any visual
disturbances during the examination.

Plaintiff's attorney's

objection to Dr. Hershgold' s testimony seemed to anticipate'
question seeking the Doctor's opinion on causation.

But no

such question was forthcoming by defendant's attorney.

rncre:.
I

plaintiff's attorney then proceeded to delve into the area o.
opinion which he had thought objectionable:
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BY MR. DeBRY:
Q

As a matter of fact you have no opinion on
whether or not his -- one way or other whether
or not his transient ischemic attacks were
caused by the arteriosclerosis or something
else?

A

I have an opinion on that.

Q

You have an opinion?

A

Oh, yes.

(R. 246]

Obviously plaintiff's attorney was hoping to elicit
from defendant's medical witness an admission that he didn't
have an opinion concerning whether or not plaintiff's arteriosclerosis caused the TIA. Plaintiff's attorney took a calculated
chance in opening up this area.

This question backfired on

him, and he didn't get the answer for which he had hoped.
Consequently after opening the door into this causation area,
plaintiff's attorney never did ask what the Doctor's opinion
was.

So on redirect examination defendant's attorney asked

the natural question:
BY MR. NEBEKER:
Q

I am not sure whether you were given the opportunity to state your opinion, Doctor. Did you
feel that you had that opportunity to give your
opinion?

MR. DeBRY: Well, I object to that unless a
proper foundation is made if he gives his opinion by
hypothetical questions or assumes this fact.
MR. NEBEKER:
I am merely completing what was
started by Mr. DeBry.

-13-
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MR. DeBRY:
It shouldn't be an abstract
It should be a concrete opinion.

..

0 1 1

P n or,

THE COU~T:
Yc;iu as~e~ him whether or not he ha'
a chance to .1.orm his opinion. And he said "Ye " ·
And you d~dn '. t ask him what it . was'.
I sup~ose ~~
redirect it is proper.
The obJ ection is overruled.
Q

(By Mr. Nebeker)
What I want to ask you is 1;
you do have an opinion and what it is. r want
to phrase my question properly.

A

I don't know precisely exactly what is the
cause of Mr. Jensen's blurred vision; that is
or of the so-called transient ischemic attacks
that he' s had.
If he came to me with the stor.
that I have heard now, my opinion would be ·
preponderantly that his transient ischernic
attacks are due to his blood vessel disease.
MR. NEBEKER:

That's all, thank you. [R. 251-E

Thus, plaintiff's Point One is not an accurate
characterization of the trial.

Defendant's counsel did not

inject suprise testimony into the trial through Dr. Hershgold.
Defendant's attorney only asked Dr. Hershgold for his finding:
and observations which he made during the examination of the
plaintiff.

If plaintiff's attorney was surprised by any

testimony, this surprise came in response to a question which
plaintiff's attorney himself asked.

This is not the kind of

surprise testimony which entitles the plaintiff to a new wa;
under Rule 59(a) (3) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 59 (a) (3) deals with the subject of New Trials
and states that:
(a) Grounds.
Subject to the provisions of R~-'
61, a new trial may be granted to all or any oft..,
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parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes;

* * * *
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against.
As the court said in In Re Nash, 227 P.2d 270, 272,
(Cal. 1951), "the surprise for which the courts have power to
grant a new trial must be some condition or situation in which
a party to a cause is unexpectedly placed, to his injury,
without any default or negligence on his own . • . which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."

The court

in State v. Anderson 290 NE.2d 510 (Ind. 1972) stated that
the party claiming he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of
surprise has a "heavy burden" of showing that ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against the surprise.
plaintiff knew

In this case

Dr. Hershgold was going to be called as an

expert witness for the defendant, and he took Dr. Hershgold's
deposition without inquiring into his opinion regarding causation
of the TIA.

Yet, when he cross-examined Dr. Hershgold, plaintiff's

attorney proceeded to ask this witness questions regarding his
opinion on this subject.

With all the discovery tools available

to plaintiff, he could easily have found out that Dr. Hershgold
had an opinion on causation which was contrary to plaintiff's
experts testimony.

Forewarned, plaintiff's attorney could

have refrained from asking opinion questions and this area
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would never have been opened up.

But since plaintiff• 5 attar:,

did choose to open it up, he cannot now claim that he was
surprised by the response to his questions.
In Pacht v. Morris, 489 P.2d 29 (Ariz. 1971) defend;
lost at trial and appealed claiming that they were surprised
when plaintiff's doctor expressed an opinion as to the perman·
ency of the injury.

The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed fa

trial court's denial of a new trial and found that defendants
knew from the allegations of the complaint that plaintiff
claimed permanent injuries and also knew that plaintiff would
call the doctor as a witness.

Defendants could have inquired

into his opinion through deposition, but didn't.

The court

ruled that there was no surprise from testimony which went tc
support the allegation of permanent injury which was maintain;
by the plaintiff throughout the action.
Similarly the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Papinea
Idaho First National Bank, 258 P. 2d 755, 758,

(Id. 1953) that

"a party cannot claim surprise from the admission of testimor.
competent, relevant, and material to the issues framed by the
pleadings."

This should be especially true in the case at ba:

where the subject of Dr. Hershgold' s opinion was first raisei
by the same party who is now claiming surprise.
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II.

THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE TRIAL COURT
REFUSED TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT COUNSEL
FOR PLAINTIFF WAS SURPRISED BY THE ANSWER TO A QUESTION
WHICH HE ASKED
Utah law is clear that the trial court has discretion

over whether or not a new trial should be granted when surprise
is claimed by the losing party.
79 262 P.2d 285
by

In Mecham v. Allen 1 Utah 2d

(1953) defendant claimed that he was surprised

the testimony of a witness produced on rebuttal regarding

the facts of the accident.

In affirming the trial court's

refusal to grant a new trial, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"Whether a new trial should have been granted was a
matter within the discretion of the trial court who
was in a better position than we are to evaluate
this evidence, determine its effect and whether it
was a planned surprise.
(262 P.2d at 293)
Courts have always looked with suspicion upon surprise
as a ground for a new trial.
P.2d 770 (Cal. 1956).

See Fletcher v. Pierceall 304

In Bott v. Wender, 453 P.2d 100 (Kan.

1969), the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the trial court's
denial of a new trial motion on the ground of surprise, and
reiterated the overriding rule that the granting of a new
trial on the grounds of surprise is discretionary on the part
of the trial court, and will not be reversed unless a clear
abuse of discretion is shown.
Appellant cites the cases of Whitfield v. Dubricat,
64

P.2d 960 (Cal. 1937) and Walker v. Distler, 296 P.2d 452

(Id. 1956).

In both of these cases, the trial judges exercised
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their discretion, granted a new trial on the ground of suru,r 1__,
and the appellate courts refused to rule that they had abusec
their discretion.

Therefore these cases really support respc:

dent's position that the trial judge's discretion will

n~~

overturned on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is s'c:,
The Honorable G. Hal Taylor, trial judge, heard the
claimed surprise testimony in the context in which it arose.
After the trial was over, he heard plaintiff's Motion for New
Trial, for which plaintiff submitted a Memorandum which is
very similar to his appellate brief.

[R. 194-199] After

considering the matter, Judge Taylor exercised his discretion
and denied the motion.

Defendant respectfully submits that

under the facts and circumstances in this case, the action of
the trial judge does not represent an abuse of discretion
entitling plaintiff to a new trial.

CONCLUSION
No surprise testimony was introduced into this case
by defendant through Dr. Hershgold.

Defendant's examination

of Dr. Hershgold concerned only his findings during the inde·
pendent medical examination, and plaintiff's complaints to hi:
during said examination.

If plaintiff was surprised by any

testimony given by Dr. Hershgold, it was opinion testimony
opened up by plaintiff's attorney dur1. ng hi' s cross-examinatio:
.
h
he gets
Plaintiff should not be heard to claim surprise w en
the answer to his own question which he does not like.
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The trial judge exercised his discretion and denied
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.

Plaintiff has produced no

evidence or law showing that the trial judge abused his discretion.

Absence such a showing the trial judge's Order denying

a new trial should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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